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Abstract To survive in and adapt to dynamic, turbulent, and complex environments,
organizations need to engage in learning. This truism is particularly relevant for army
organizations in times of war and armed conflict. In this article a case of army operations
during World War II is analyzed on the basis of }Ortenblad’s integrated model of the
learning organization and Argyris and Scho¨n’s theory of action approach. Among others, it
is found that survival of and adaptation to combat conditions is possible through single-
loop learning, provided that this learning takes place in an open and productive learning
climate. This and other conclusions have important implications for theory and practice of
organizational learning under conditions of hierarchy and discipline.
Keywords Learning organization  Army organization  After action reports 
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Army organizations are relatively seldom studied by organization scientists, probably due
to unfamiliarity with (or even repugnance to) military affairs, the dangers in acquiring data,
and a shared image of armies as simple, routine-ridden ‘‘machines’’ (Morgan 1997;
Moskos 1984; Mutch 2006; Talbot 2003). This lack of attention, however, does not seem
fully justifiable. Armies constitute the world’s oldest large-scale organizations, repre-
senting centuries of experience in surviving arguably the most competitive, turbulent and
dynamic situation an organization may encounter, i.e., actual war. Moreover, the image of
armies as hierarchical and bureaucratic ‘‘machines’’ seems at odds with the degree of
flexibility and adaptation current organization theory requires of organizations in such
turbulent and dynamic situations (March and Weissinger-Baylon 1986; Wilson 1989). In
other words, army organizations seem to pose a ‘‘learning paradox’’ here.
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Of all armies, the Prussian (and later the German) Army usually is portrayed as the most
‘‘machine-like’’ (Morgan 1997; Talbot 2003; Wilson 1989). This army is often associated
with rigid hierarchy (‘‘Befehl ist Befehl’’) and strict discipline (‘‘Kadavergehorsam’’),
which characteristics do not seem conducive to a flexible adaptation to the contingencies of
war. Yet, despite this association and in spite of having lost Word War II, military his-
torians generally agree that the German Army was one of the most adaptive and flexible
armies in that war (e.g., Dupuy 1984; Hart 2001; Murray 1992; Van Creveld 1983).
Apparently, the German Army had found ways to resolve the ‘‘learning paradox’’ and to
combine conditions of hierarchy and discipline with adaptability and flexibility. This was
so, primarily because the German Army was organized in accordance with many aspects
currently associated with the learning organization, as this paper purports to show.
In this paper I analyze a particular case of German Army operations on the basis of
}Ortenblad’s integrated model of the learning organization and the theoretical framework of
Argyris and Scho¨n. Recognizing the ambiguity of the concept of learning organization in
the work of early proponents like Senge (1990), and on the basis of an extended literature
review and synthesis, }Ortenblad (2002, 2004, 2007) distinguishes four aspects, discussed in
detail below, which must be present for an organization to be properly called ‘‘learning.’’
The framework of Argyris and Scho¨n (1974, 1978, 1996) complements this model by
explicitly furthering insight into two of these aspects and implicitly supporting two others.
More in general, Argyris and Scho¨n were the first to depart from a purely descriptive,
academic-oriented approach to analyzing organizational learning and to adopt a more
prescriptive, practice-oriented approach to developing learning organizations (Easterby-
Smith and Lyles 2003; Easterby-Smith et al. 2004; Tsang 1997). The army case involved is
the Polish campaign and its aftermath (1939–1940), which case more than later German
operations shows the significance of learning from past events for future performance.
This paper proceeds first with a brief outline of the model of }Ortenblad and the theo-
retical framework of Argyris and Scho¨n. Second, this framework is applied to the German
Army’s Polish campaign and its aftermath, drawing on secondary military and historical
sources. Finally, conclusions are drawn and implications sketched for present organiza-
tions, and a few cautionary notes are made.
The learning organization: an integrated model
On the basis of }Ortenblad (2002, 2004) and Argyris and Scho¨n (1974, 1978, 1996) four
aspects may be distinguished that must be present for an organization to be appropriately
labeled a learning organization.
Organizational learning
The first aspect is organizational learning, in which agents learn for the organization, the
results of which are stored in organizational memory. Central to such learning, according
to Argyris and Scho¨n, is the cyclical relationship between knowledge and action. Human
action should lead to more effective knowledge, which in its turn should lead to more
effective action. Argyris and Scho¨n express this relationship in the cognitive concept of
theory of action, which has the general form: ‘‘in situation S, if you want to achieve
consequence C, under assumptions a1…an, do A’’ (Argyris and Scho¨n 1974, p. 6). The
assumptions constitute a model of the world, in which it is likely that action strategy A will
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lead to consequence C in situation S. Besides these elements, theories of action contain
governing variables, norms, and values that make consequence C desirable or worthwhile
to achieve.
Learning starts when actual consequences of an action strategy do not correspond with
expected consequences. This discrepancy between expectation and result is considered an
error and leads to a problematic situation, which calls for a period of reflection and inquiry
by the acting organizational members. Learning then involves the detection and correction
of error on the basis of inquiry. It may be accomplished by single-loop learning (in which
members mitigate the discrepancy between expected and actual consequences by adjusting
their action strategy A and assumptions a1…an, but without changing their norms and
values that make consequence C desirable) or by double-loop learning (in which members
mitigate the discrepancy between expected and actual consequences by adjusting their
action strategy A, assumptions a1…an, and by changing their norms and values that make
consequence C desirable). Double-loop learning thus involves a more profound and deep
way of learning than single-loop learning.
In addition, Argyris and Scho¨n (1978, 1996) distinguish deutero-learning as a form of
higher learning, relative to single-loop learning and double-loop learning.1 To learn to
single-loop learn implies learning to improve performance at an increasing rate. To learn to
double-loop learn implies learning to carry out reflection on and inquiry into the governing
variables, norms, and values underlying organizational action.
Argyris and Scho¨n link individual to organizational learning by pointing out that, by
virtue of delegated responsibilities, some organizational members are empowered to speak
and act on behalf of the whole organization, not only in top positions, but in every role or
function dealing with external relations. Those members learn when they experience the
discrepancy between consequences of an action, expected on the basis of organizational
theory of action, and actual consequences. If the organization as a whole is to learn, then
the corrective actions these members undertake on the basis of a reflective inquiry into the
causes of that discrepancy should become embedded in organizational memory (the whole
of individual and shared maps and images of organizational theory of action) and in
organizational routines and procedures.
Learning climate
The second aspect is learning climate, in which an organization facilitates the learning of its
members. Argyris and Scho¨n have inquired into the ways in which the learning climate (or
behavioral world) of an organization inhibits or promotes reflection and inquiry. Based on
their consulting and seminar experience, Argyris and Scho¨n assert that most organizations
are driven by a Model O-I theory of action. This model is characterized by a defensive
attitude among individuals and a defensive learning climate in the organization as a whole,
making collaborative reflection on and inquiry into the causes of error hard to achieve.
As an alternative to Model O-I, Argyris and Scho¨n advocate a Model O-II theory of
action. This model is characterized by an open attitude among individuals and a productive
learning climate in the organization as a whole, enabling collaborative reflection and
inquiry. Argyris and Scho¨n regard Model O-II as a crucial condition for double-loop
1 Argyris and Scho¨n’s use of the term deutero-learning is surrounded by terminological ambiguities, making
it difficult to distinguish it properly from double-loop learning and to compare it to other forms of higher-
order learning. Elsewhere I have discussed these ambiguities and proposed a theoretical reformulation of
this term (Visser 2003, 2007).
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learning, and double-loop learning in its turn as a crucial condition for organizational
survival in the long run. Model O-II organizations, however, are rarely found in practice,
and often external interventions are necessary to create a productive learning climate.
Learning at work
The third aspect is learning at work, in which most learning takes place in the workplace
and not in formal training courses. Given the difficulties surrounding the transfer of
learning and knowledge from the formal training situation to the daily workplace and given
the context dependent nature of learning, most learning takes place on-the-job (Holton
et al. 2003; }Ortenblad 2002, 2004). Argyris and Scho¨n implicitly adopt the same approach,
since for them learning is directly tied to error detection and correction in the context of
daily work practices.
Learning structure
The fourth aspect is learning structure, in which an organization has an organic and flexible
structure to meet external demands, in three ways. First, such a structure is decentralized,
leaving members sufficient discretion to make their own decisions in response to external
demands. Second, such a structure is team-based, in which team members are able to
replace each other, perform each others’ tasks and thus acquire a holistic view of team and
organizational functioning. Third, such a structure is flat, although it may be possible that
an organic structure is hierarchical (}Ortenblad 2002, 2004). Argyris and Scho¨n (1978)
implicitly adopt the same approach, when they assert that specialization of work tasks and
centralization of power and information in hierarchically structured organizations rein-
forces Model O-I theories of action and singe-loop learning and thus hinders the double-
loop learning, necessary for long-term survival of the organization.
Case: the Polish campaign and its aftermath
When the German Army invaded Poland in September 1939, it brought to bear a distinct
philosophy of war which acknowledged the existence of environmental uncertainty and
turbulence and emphasized the need for a decentralized approach to adapt to it. This
philosophy was deeply influenced by the crushing defeat of the Prussian Army at the hands
of Napoleon in the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt (1806). In reflecting on the causes of defeat,
leading military philosophers and practitioners like Von Clausewitz, Von Scharnhorst, and
Von Moltke gradually came to the fundamental insight that friction, uncertainty, and
ambiguity are inherent in the ‘‘fog of war.’’ These characteristics should be accepted as
given, rather than being contained in vain through detailed planning and upper-echelon
hierarchical control (Uhle-Wetter 1993; Van Creveld 1983; Widder 2002).
To deal effectively with the ‘‘fog of war,’’ German war doctrine increasingly encour-
aged individual initiative, independent thinking, and responsibility at all levels of
command. This doctrinal approach became known as ‘‘Auftragstaktik,’’ a command and
control system in which commanders were being given missions, rather than orders. In this
system ‘‘the mission must unmistakably express the will of the commander. The objective,
course of action and mission constraints, such as time, must be clear and definite without
restricting freedom of action more than necessary in order to make use of the initiative of
individuals charged with the tasks to be accomplished. Limits as to the method of
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execution, within the framework of the higher commander’s will, are imposed only where
essential for coordination with other commands’’ (Von Lossow 1977, pp. 87–88).
Guided by this doctrine, the German campaign in Poland seemed a devastating success.
Within a few weeks, the complete Polish Army (40 divisions, one million men) had been
caught in a huge encirclement, with five German armies simultaneously closing in from the
German mainland, East Prussia, and from Slovakia (Citino 2004). The Germans prevailed
not so much because of ‘‘Blitzkrieg,’’ the rapid and bold advance of Panzer and motorized
divisions supported by tactical air assaults. They mainly prevailed because of ‘‘hard-
hitting, well-trained infantry, well-supported by artillery, and tactical air assets’’ (Newland
2004, p. 87). Of the 54 divisions committed in that campaign, only seven were Panzer, four
were motorized, and four mechanized light divisions; the rest was infantry, largely horse-
drawn, and not motorized. Further, the Germans made optimal use of radio in ‘‘holding
together… air assets, mechanized spearheads, follow-on infantry and the huge supply
chain’’ (Citino 2004, p. 339). For example, when a Polish counterattack east of Warsaw
threatened two German infantry divisions, within a week the motorized units of the 8th
Army shifted their course 180 to divert the Polish counterattack and, after accomplishing
this mission, shifted again 180 to hurry back on their original course to Warsaw. The
Polish forces suffered from poor communications, forcing their units to attack in isolation
and without support (Peszke 1979).
In spite of its smooth appearance and although most political, strategic, and operational
factors were favorable to the German side, the Polish campaign was not the flawless
success Nazi propaganda quickly made of it. After only 18 days of fighting, the German
Army had almost completely run out of petrol, weapons, and ammunition (Frieser 2005;
Peszke 1979). Furthermore, it had suffered huge equipment losses. Due to poor roads and
rough terrain tanks, armored vehicles and trucks broke down in large numbers (by the end
of September the whole XIX Panzer Corps was temporarily immobilized for this reason).
In the whole Polish campaign the Germans lost no less than 217 tanks, making it anything
but an ‘‘exercise with live ammunition’’ (Peszke 1979, p. 23).
Not surprisingly, the German Army high command (‘‘Oberkommando des Heeres,’’
hereafter OKH) was not satisfied with many aspects of the Polish campaign. Directly after the
end of the campaign in October 1939, the Army commander-in-chief, Colonel-General Von
Brauchitsch, ordered his corps and division commanders to come up with as critical, honest
and realistic after action reports (‘‘Erfahrungsberichte’’) as possible. In the same spirit, these
senior commanders in their turn should collect after action reports from their subordinate
commanders down to regimental level. Within 1 month these reports were written, collected,
and passed on to OKH (Hart 2001; Murray 1981, 1992). In general lower commanders were
not afraid to give critical and accurate accounts of their units’ performance, indicating a high
level of trust and honesty between echelons that seemed characteristic of the German Army
throughout World War II (Van Creveld 1983; Uhle-Wetter 1993).
On the basis of the assembled ‘‘Erfahrungsberichte,’’ OKH concluded that the Polish
campaign had confirmed basic doctrine and principles of German operational warfare, but
also had revealed important deficiencies in the functioning of light mechanized divisions,
in reconnaissance, coordination, camouflage skills, and in night fighting. Infantry was
generally lacking aggressiveness and depended too much on artillery to crush enemy
positions. Armor had been too much dispersed, poorly coordinated, and lacking in march
discipline (Hart 2001). Further, OKH concluded that several of these basic principles
needed reemphasis and retraining, in particular effective combat leadership and initiative at
all levels of command, cooperation between weapons and branches, and elastic defense in
depth (Murray 1981).
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However, when in November 1939 Von Brauchitsch confronted Hitler with these
deficiencies and the retraining challenges they posed, Hitler went into a rage and threa-
tened to dismiss him on the spot. Underrating Allied strength and believing that time was
on his side, Hitler wanted an attack on Western Europe as quickly as possible, from which
plan his military advisors could only dissuade him on the grounds of unfavorable weather
conditions (Frieser 2005).
Under this political pressure, OKH frantically set out to convert the lessons of the Polish
campaign into a vast, 6-months (re)training program, not only for the units that had been
involved in that campaign, but also, and even more importantly, for the numerous new
units and existing reserve units that Hitler intended to commit against the West in the
Spring of 1940. In that program, OKH directly tied the lessons of Poland to the training of
existing and new troops, emphasizing the importance of combat leadership of officers and
non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and the importance of discipline and order as a basis
for victory. The General Staff’s training section developed a detailed set of objectives and
standards for training in the various schools of the German Army, where officers and
NCOs with recent combat experience were brought in as instructors (Hart 2001; Murray
1981; Van Creveld 1983).
The training program worked from the bottom up, first developing the capabilities of
individual soldiers, then working on performance improvement at platoon and company
levels, and finally ending with large scale exercises at battalion and regimental levels. For
commanding officers a special training division was set up, organizing 3- to 4-week
courses through which 300 officers passed each time (Frieser 2005). Officers (and NCOs)
at all levels of command were inculcated with the need to lead from up front, take
initiative, and employ decisive action, in line with the doctrine of ‘‘Auftragstaktik.’’
Throughout the 6 months, training was methodical, detailed, and rigorous, approaching
real combat conditions as close as possible. Often men and officers were exerted to their
mental and physical limits to foster unit cohesion and to determine who could endure real
battle and who could not (Hart 2001; Murray 1981).
The important role of doctrine and training became visible in the campaign in the West
in May 1940. Within 6 weeks, the German Army defeated the French, Belgian, and Dutch
armies and the British Expeditionary Forces. The Germans prevailed because of the
boldness, speed, and unpredictability of their spearhead Panzer and motorized divisions,
which continuously threw the methodical, defensive, and cautiously reacting French Army
high command off balance (Alexander 2007; Frieser 2005). Since, however, only 16 out of
157 committed divisions were fully motorized, a considerable role in the campaign was
also played by conventional infantry, displaying a large amount of ‘‘battlefield improvi-
sation made possible by the superior leadership and training of the German soldier’’
(Kiesling 2007, p. 883). All this happened although the German Army still was inferior to
the Allied forces in number of soldiers, divisions, artillery pieces, aircraft, and in terms of
quality and quantity of tanks, still had a shortage of sufficiently trained officers (in spite of
the training efforts), and still showed deficiencies in motorization, logistics, and artillery
capabilities (Frieser 2005; Hart 2001).
Case analysis
Applying the model of }Ortenblad and the framework of Argyris and Scho¨n to German
Army operations between 1939 and 1940 reveals that all four aspects clearly or to some
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extent play a role, supporting the assertion that this army was organized in accordance with
many aspects currently associated with the learning organization.
The aspect of organizational learning is clearly present in the case. The German Army
did learn in Argyris and Scho¨n’s sense in that a number of actually occurring consequences
in the Polish campaign did not conform to the consequences the Germans expected on the
basis of their doctrine and principles. This discrepancy gave rise to a process of reflection
and inquiry, in which the after action reports of various units played a central role, to
detection, and ultimately to correction of the perceived errors. Furthermore, this learning
by the German Army was organizational to the extent that the lessons learned from the
‘‘Erfahrungsberichte’’ were as quickly and thoroughly as possible converted by OKH and
the General Staff into guidelines for a vast (re)training program for existing and new units.
Through a methodical and rigorous implementation of the program the experiences of the
Polish campaign were within 6 months incorporated in the combat routines and procedures
of the German Army as a whole. The dominant type of learning in the German Army
seemed to have been single loop, since the norms and values underlying existing doctrine
and principles were not seriously questioned. Instead, OKH emphasized that various
combat practices needed to be upgraded in line with prevalent norms and standards.
The aspect of learning climate is also clearly present in the case. In the German Army
learning seemed to have been possible, due to a relatively open and productive learning
climate, even in spite of political pressure. Senior Army commanders, most notably the
commander-in-chief himself, insisted on critical and accurate after action reports from
lower commanders, who in their turn were not afraid to issue such reports. Relatively high
levels of mutual trust and honesty were characteristic of communication between different
echelons, facilitating the exchange of accurate information up and well-informed mission
orders down the German chain of command. All these aspects point in the direction of a
Model O-II theory of action and a productive learning climate, which Argyris and Scho¨n
advocate for double loop learning, but which they rarely found in practice.
The aspect of learning at work is to some extent present in the case. In the German
Army learning seemed to have been occurring mostly in formal training programs.
However, these programs were closely tied to the lessons learned in the Polish campaign
and to existing doctrine, while the actual training, carried out under the guidance of combat
veterans, approached real battle conditions as close as possible. Under these conditions the
transfer of learning from the training situation to the workplace may have been less
difficult than in other organizations under different conditions.
The aspect of learning structure is also to some extent present in the case. In the
German Army decision-making was decentralized and the need for decisive action at all
levels of command was emphasized, in accordance with the doctrine of ‘‘Auftragstaktik.’’
Further, much emphasis was laid on the development of unit cohesion, in which officers,
NCO’s, and men came to know each other intimately and were able to replace each other in
case of war attrition. Finally, like all armies, the German Army was characterized by a
hierarchical structure, but this was compensated by decentralized decision-making and
high levels of trust between echelons.
Conclusions and discussion
The past example of the German case suggests that it is possible to combine aspects
associated with the learning organization with conditions of hierarchy and discipline.
Under such conditions, empowerment, trust, and leadership become crucial elements in
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sustaining learning (cf. Jamali et al. 2006; Popper and Lipshitz 2000). From the lowest
echelons upward, organization members and junior leaders must be accorded considerable
leeway in performing their tasks, as long as they remain within the organization’s specific
mission and goals. They must be thoroughly educated and trained to assume responsibility,
take initiative, and decisive action whenever possible and necessary to accomplish that
mission. With lower echelon initiative and action the possibilities of errors increase, and
with these the opportunities for learning. As much as the higher echelons should trust their
members and junior leaders to undertake responsible action, the latter should trust their
superiors to maintain an open learning climate and to treat errors as learning opportunities,
not as occasions for punishment. The attitude of senior leaders is crucial in this respect,
especially in hierarchical organizations.
The German example from the past has implications for present organizations. In the
first place, they are pertinent for army organizations. After World War II many armies have
formally embraced German doctrine and principles of warfare, especially the doctrine of
mission command (‘‘Auftragstaktik’’). In particular the US Army, at present the world’s
most powerful army, champions these tactics. It explicitly strives to become an army that
intends to learn from past mistakes through the establishment of a Center for Army
Lessons Learned (e.g., Baird et al. 1997; Chua et al. 2006; Wheatley 1994), and through a
more systematic use of after action reviews (e.g., Baird et al. 1999; Darling et al. 2005).
However, the existence of this separate Center also suggests that learning is not normally
or sufficiently practiced in the US Army’s line organization, whereas in the German Army
this was part of daily routine, actively encouraged by senior commanders and crucially
important for the improvement of training and doctrine. More in general, many observers
note that mission command and learning seem to be more theory than practice in the US
Army, which is still characterized by detailed planning, command, and control from the top
down (e.g., Boothe 2005; Clemons and Santamaria 2002; Dunivan 2003; Leonhard 1993).
In the second place, the implications of the German case are pertinent for civilian orga-
nizations that share one or more army features, like prisons, correctional facilities, police
forces, hospitals, mental institutions, and fire departments. Like armies, such organizations
more or less regularly deal with emotionally intense life-death emergency situations, they
acknowledge the necessity of strong unit cohesion and clear leadership in such emergencies,
and they are all more or less characterized by an inclusive atmosphere. Furthermore, they all
must to some extent balance conditions of hierarchy and discipline with the need for flexi-
bility and rapid adaptation to emergencies (e.g., Amitay et al. 2005; Visser 2007). In a wider
sense, the implications of this case also are pertinent for other bureaucratic organizations that
strive to become learning organizations (Jamali et al. 2006; Wilson 1989).
Armies, more or less ‘‘army-like’’ civilian organizations, and bureaucratic organizations
striving to be learning organizations must think systematically and holistically about
combining conditions of hierarchy and discipline with the need for empowerment, trust,
and leadership, in order to remain flexible and adaptive. It will not be sufficient to single
out one aspect, like learning from after action reports, if this is not further embedded in
other aspects of the organization. The results of such learning, for example, must be
embedded in organizational memory, systems, routines, and training practices in order to
reach all corners of the organization. Such learning must be conducted in a productive
learning climate to be really effective. Such learning must have direct implications for
daily work practices. Such learning must be actively propagated from the top down and be
carried out with the same discipline as the regular tasks of the organization. Most
importantly, hierarchical organizations must resist the ever-present temptation toward
centralization and more detailed command and control from the top down, so that the lower
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echelons may have meaningful decision-making discretion and with it the opportunity lo
learn from the consequences of good and bad decisions.
Finally, two cautionary notes on the German case are in order. In the first place, the
operations of the German Army must be placed in a larger (geo)political picture. The
specific culture and operations of the Army in this period were sharply circumscribed by
the context of Hitler’s national-socialist policies and institutions. Matters of strategy,
politics, and economics largely were beyond the Army’s sphere of influence and compe-
tence. In the course of World War II, German Army operations could not overcome
political and strategic blundering. By being effectively and efficiently instrumental in the
implementation of poor political and strategic decisions, the Army partially masked this
poor quality and unnecessarily prolonged an already lost war. The worst political and
strategic mistake, most military historians agree, was waging a two-front war against the
combined Allied forces, given the uneven balance of industrial, logistical, and human
resources between German and Allied forces (e.g., Beaumont 1986; Frieser 2005; Murray
1992; Van Creveld 1988).
In the second place, with this paper I do not intend to diminish the responsibility of the
German Army for World War II war crimes and genocide, which by many accounts was
considerable (e.g., Bartov 1991; Beaumont 1986; Hart 2001), nor do I wish to engage in
revisionist history (re)writing. Yet, six decades after the end of the war an attempt may be
made to extract some positive lessons from this tragedy. The German Army was a very
effectively learning fighting machine, whose principles of organization and operation
found their way and contributed to the rapid postwar economic recovery of Germany
(Glunk et al. 1996). However, with the Allied victory these principles quickly were
replaced by the management concepts of the victors, in particular those of American stock
(Hofstede 1993). This paper represents an attempt to recover these older German principles
and to place them in the service of more peaceful and socially useful purposes.
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